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PROGRESSIVE INCREMENTALISM:
U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
John M. Curtis 
As we look ahead following last year’s U.S. presidential and congressional elections,
Canadians — and Canadian business in particular — will want to have a better sense of
the economic prospects, as well as the context, of U.S. foreign economic policy over the
coming half-decade or so. For, notwithstanding all the talk, debates, op-ed articles, think-
tank-pieces and even books in recent years suggesting or asserting the decline of American
economic power, Canada’s ever-present integration and interdependence with our southern
neighbour is both a reality and now, again, an important, medium-term asset. Over the
coming four years and likely beyond, and once it has completed sorting out its “fiscal
cliff” matter, the U.S. is positioned to be the source of increasing economic growth. The
American economy has strengths: its high productivity and innovation compared to most
other countries, massive piles of private sector cash leading to all sorts of investment
potential, a devalued currency, and a relatively young workforce compared to the
European Union, Japan, and even Canada. Therefore, although the U.S. economy
continues to face large challenges related to fiscal imbalances, there are reasons to expect
increasing economic growth over the medium term. 
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LE GRADUALISME: LA POLITIQUE 
ÉCONOMIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DES 
É.-U. AU COURS DES QUATRE 
PROCHAINES ANNÉES
John M. Curtis
RÉSUMÉ
Dans la foulée des élections présidentielles et au Congrès des États-Unis 
l’année dernière, les Canadiens — et en particulier les gens d’affaires — 
voudraient être en mesure de mieux cerner les perspectives économiques 
ainsi que le contexte de la politique économique étrangère des États-Unis pour 
les cinq prochaines années, plus ou moins. Car peu importe les discussions 
et les débats, les éditoriaux, les articles d’experts et même les livres parus 
récemment et qui suggèrent, ou même affirment le déclin de la puissance 
économique américaine, l’intégration et l’interdépendance du Canada avec 
son voisin du sud constitue encore et toujours une réalité et demeure pour 
l’instant un atout à moyen terme. Au cours des quatre prochaines années, 
et probablement au-delà, et une fois que les États-Unis auront trouvé une 
solution à leur problème de « précipice budgétaire », le pays sera en position 
de relancer la croissance économique. L’économie américaine a des forces : 
sa vigueur sur le plan de la productivité et de l’innovation, comparativement 
à la plupart des pays, des réserves imposantes d’argent dans le secteur privé 
pouvant déboucher sur des investissements de toutes sortes, une monnaie 
dévaluée et une main-d’œuvre relativement jeune par rapport à celle de 
l’Union européenne, du Japon et même du Canada. Par conséquent, bien 
que l’économie des États-Unis demeure confrontée à des défis de taille en 
ce qui a trait aux déséquilibres fiscaux, on peut s’attendre à une croissance 
économique à moyen terme. 
Canada, along with its strengthening trade and economic relationships with other parts of the
world, faces an increasingly positive external environment, notwithstanding the European
Union’s current debt and banking issues, as well as the slowing of growth in several key
emerging markets. The global economic environment directly affecting Canada, that is, will
neither be spectacular, nor historically strong, but will be one on which to build an even stronger
foundation for future job growth and prosperity. At a minimum, given the coming U.S.
economic strength, Canada will be sheltered to a large extent from the downturn that economies
largely comparable to ours — such as Australia — will likely endure in the months ahead.
Within this broader context, and attempting to anticipate, if not predict, probable U.S. foreign
economic policy directions over the coming four years or so, several “stylized facts,” or
premises, should be made clear:
FIRST: The “fiscal cliff”1 alluded to above will get resolved more definitively by the
new Congress during the first half of 2013.
SECOND: While the foreign economic policy of many countries is a subset of foreign
policy, in the case of the United States, this is certainly the case. For example, even
while shaping the postwar economic order with the broad foreign policy objective of
ensuring peace and stability, the United States insisted, from 1947 onward, that the
new, global international trade rules — which became the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and after 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) —
must, in effect, protect the interventions in the (basically) free-market American
economy. The postwar trade regime, with its principles of openness, transparency,
and non-discrimination, was thus designed to leave plenty of domestic-policy space
for pre-existing and prospective U.S. domestic interventionist policies — this latitude
extending, of course, to other GATT/WTO members. Similarly, the headquarters of
the new international financial and development institutions — the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank) — were placed in Washington, D.C. under the careful
watch both of the State Department and the Department of the Treasury, with
officials from both agencies assigned to the senior level of both international bodies.
THIRD: On a related point, foreign economic policy everywhere remains a
manifestation and extension of domestic economic policy, the politics and
economics of which — and the tension between producer interests and consumer
interests with respect to every sector and to every issue — are central to every
international economic policy initiative considered and/or taken.
FOURTH: The United States is committed to the rule of law, including its
enforcement. This fact — shared by others, but reaching its peak in every aspect of
life within the United States, enabled both by its political and its legal system —
leads to a predictably inward focus and an innate conservatism in terms of seeking
out and encouraging institutional change to meet new realities, or at times, to rectify
old ones.
1 The “fiscal cliff” refers to the automatic tax increases and drastic spending cuts that were scheduled to take effect on
January 1 of this year had the outgoing Congress not intervened.
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FIFTH: On the other hand, the United States retains what some call its “exorbitant
privilege” by virtue of the fact that its national currency is the world’s de facto
reserve currency and the primary medium of international exchange. This fact
means that there is less discipline on U.S. fiscal and monetary practices than in any
other country — both a blessing and a curse, as events over the past decade have
demonstrated so clearly.
SIXTH: And finally, the United States remains the world’s pre-eminent economic power
with the responsibility, in theory and in practice, of providing leadership to protect and
shape the international economic regime, and enforcing unilaterally, or through
mutually agreed upon procedures, the ground rules for its ongoing operations. 
In recent years, and for any number of reasons, neither the United States nor the wider world
community has shown much concerted demand for change where foreign economic policy is
concerned. While there have been calls from many and varied quarters for change, there has not
been effective leadership, or success, in achieving much. For example, there have been calls for
a recommitment to the G20; for reform of the International Monetary Fund’s governance
structure to reflect Asia’s growing importance; for more socially and environmentally sensitive
assistance programs at the World Bank and various regional banks; for tougher financial
regulations; for renewed global trade talks to either complete the 11-year-old Doha round, or to
begin a new negotiating round with a more current, business-friendly or relevant agenda; and for
a credible post-Kyoto climate-change treaty. All these voices, important as they are, have not led
to a clear demand for change within any of the international economic areas cited above. The
global uniqueness or exceptionalism of the United States, combined with its inwardness, have
not provoked or stimulated any clear manifestation of U.S. leadership, or the leadership of any
other country, individuals, or groups of individuals. 
In these circumstances, the United States, the traditional economic hegemon and guardian of the
system, has only actively attempted to shape international economic discussions where it feels
that its direct interests, or those of its “clients,” are affected. The status quo, with sufficient
“tweaking” to advance the system where absolutely necessary — progressive incrementalism —
has characterized the recent past, and will continue to do so, with possibly two exceptions.
One is with respect to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the other is the complex matter of
Iran, the Middle East more generally, and the price of oil.
With respect to the Trans-Pacific Partnership: this prospective regional trade agreement has
evolved into Washington’s top international economic policy priority. Although conceived as
early as 2005, and promoted over the next couple of years by four countries — New Zealand,
Chile, Brunei, and Singapore (the P4) — the United States latched onto this now-expanded pan-
Pacific trade initiative several years later, early in the Obama presidency, as part of the U.S.
“tilt” towards Asia. Several overlapping, yet important geo-strategic, as well as economic
factors, were undoubtedly involved: advancing further trade liberalization and stepped-up
regulatory alignment, without the counterweight of the European Union or the demands of
developing countries — large and small — as has been the case in the stalled global, World
Trade Organization negotiations; the prospect of achieving job growth and future prosperity
without (at least for now) involving the world’s largest trader, and second largest economy,
China; and the ability of the United States, which is by far the largest participating country in
the now 12-nation talks, to shape the negotiations — by insisting on a post-NAFTA template —
toward a “next generation” agreement for the rest of the world to emulate in due course.
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When, and if, the TPP is successfully negotiated — with Canada and Mexico now joining the
talks officially in December 2012, and Japan perhaps eventually joining — it will supplement
and possibly even replace the Canada-U.S.-Mexico NAFTA, the still-nebulous Pacific Alliance,
the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement, and the many
other regional and sub-regional agreements and arrangements around the Pacific Rim that have
been entered into over the past decade.  If successful, it will overshadow the multi-faceted and
not-terribly-effective Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum — the one Pacific
institution in which Canada has been most active to date — and become the principal vehicle of
economic integration in the region. Moving the TPP initiative along will remain the central
international economic focus of the U.S. over the next four years, and it will be a much less
controversial issue than other major international economic issues, such as strengthened
international financial regulations, or those related to climate change2. 
The United States will also show leadership in a progressively incremental way concerning Iran
and oil. Unlike the active and obvious leadership that the U.S. is demonstrating with respect to
the TPP, the U.S., in this instance, is proceeding in a very different way, with very different
objectives: it is quietly but firmly taking steps to protect its allies and client states in the region
and around the world by ensuring that geo-political/strategic decisions do not result in the price
of oil being either too high or too low. Oil prices that remain too high by historical standards
will hurt the world economy, including the U.S. economy; oil prices that are too low, will
seriously diminish revenues of countries reliant on oil exports, many of whom depend on the
United States for security. While, as a general matter, oil is not as key an element in the world
economy as it was in previous years, it remains important in the case of transportation and the
movement of goods and services across borders — the core of the liberal world order.
As noted earlier, in other areas of international economic policy — from the G7/G20; reform of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); strengthening international financial regulations;
completing the Doha round with the World Trade Organization (WTO) or developing a new
agenda for global trade talks within or outside the WTO; or turning to trade-related climate-
change matters — the U.S. will remain an active and interested participant, advancing and
defending its own interests. But it will not be seen to, or wish to, take the lead. It undoubtedly
will continue to act as the guardian and promoter of each of the many international regimes and
practices in place worldwide, and of the institutions that support them. But it will follow the
mantra of promoting actively ongoing incremental change only where necessary to keep these
international policy frameworks relevant in the contemporary world. It is still clear that nothing
can or will get done comprehensively in today’s world economy — no substantive reform, no
significant operational changes — unless the U.S. is part of the solution. Its importance in all of
these bodies and on all of these issues should not be minimized, even in a world of shifting
global power; it is simply that the United States, over time, is narrowing its focus to fit its
means and taking a less-strident leadership role than that which characterized most of the past
half-century.
2 While estimates of the possible economic impact of a successfully completed TPP vary, some suggest that the impact
on growth and jobs will equal that of a completed, worldwide Doha-round trade agreement, if the latter were ever
completed.
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For Canada, this “steady-as-she-goes” forward movement — with the only real U.S. drive
manifested with respect to the TPP and Iran and oil — will mean no dramatic change. At the
most general, macro-economic level, the slow, ongoing-but-upward trajectory of the U.S.
economy will provide continuing, underpinning support for our economy — for jobs; for
investment; for technology transfer; for innovation; for energy; and for involvement in U.S.-led
global-value chains serving final markets in both the U.S. itself and U.S. markets abroad.
Increased confidence from U.S. consumers and businesses will also flow over the border to
Canada, leading to more optimism and thus, a sense of confidence in prospects here. Since
economic growth (expanding GDP) in a country’s trading partner is the primary factor in
influencing the amount and direction of trade and investment with that partner, Canada-U.S.
cross-border activity will expand over the coming four years; the currently repressed share of
75 per cent of total Canadian merchandise exports going to the United States — compared to a
high of 87 per cent as recently as 2001 — is probably at a cyclical low. Since security will
continue to trump trade, particularly from a U.S. perspective, progress on the Beyond the Border
joint-security approach and the Regulatory Cooperation Council will remain an important
bilateral focus between our two countries.
On the larger questions — the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Iran, G7/G20, financial regulations,
IMF reform, and perhaps even climate change — Canada, too, will continue to be a presence.
But, like the U.S., it will be at least an active, but not a leading participant. It is at times like
this, when little intellectual “heavy lifting” is being done by anyone, that a relatively small
country, such as Canada, has an opportunity to punch above its weight and to shine. 
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